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SPACE A m  IN THESOVlEI' UNKIN, JAPAN, 
AND THE PEOPUS REPUBllC OF CHINA* 
& kllnrh of SpWd I by dac Saricf Unioa on Octobtr 4. 1957. 
began the en of d c m  s p d i g h t .  Within fouf maarhs. rhc U n i d  
States hd joined tbe "spx dub" with tbc swxtaful orbiting of Ex- 
p l b r r r I . ~ a n d a h a l f p u r ~ b c f w t a t h * d a u i o o p i a e d t h i s  
* - 
ad& u~wuwra; Fru~c put m A1 sadhe into orbit oa November 
26. 1%5. Japan and the Peopk's Republic of Chim bcumc Asia's 
q m s a ~ i t i o a  in spwc in 1970; dtc Jlpvrac Omai and thc Chincst 
EastIr Redrcrcorbimlon F&wq 11 and April 24. rrspmiPdy. Thc 
fulll mcmbcr of the "Spx Six," thc ( I n i d  Kiogdom. hunched thc 
satdlitc h s p m  on ocmbcf 28. 1971. Gxnpativc dam for these 
satellite hunches arc given ia nhk 1. in 1981. thc Europcvl space 
Agency d Ucly bmunc dw smcnth oguLntw, - - * 3tobOOSfitSorrn 
paybad into orbit. As tbc number of sprcfuiag nations grows, we 
shouMlodrW?ndcxamimwharcommonanddiPicrgcnt~~ 
havcsparkcdthithruffinto~. ForthcpurposcsofdKYdcUnivcr- 
sity Naiad Aeronautics d Spacc Adminkation (NASA) Conference 
on thc History of Space Activity. rhis papcr will concenmc on the space 
jx0gram.s of threc of the six nations that haw undcrrakcn their own spec 
pmgmm-thc Soviet Union, Japan, and thc People's Republic of 
China-ining briefly thc typcs of Lunch vchicks thcy have uscd and 
tht classes of splrccnft they have launched. 
To und-rstuld why six countria have engaged in such a costly cnter- 
prix as splrdight, wc must realize that for cach country thcrc cxistcd a 
m p k x  set of motivations for taking that first ncp. For thc purposcs of 
analysis. that motivations cm be b d m  d o w ~ ~  into thrcc basic 
atcgories-political and military. xicntific. and practical. Thcx 
categoria axe c c r t l y  not mlusivc compartmmts, and I havt not at- 
tcmptcd to ratc one cotintry's justifications for ilndenaki-rg a space pro- 
gram as mort socially acccptabk than another's. 
It would seem that most nations made the commiuncnt to spacc 
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oncc their public leaders ame to xt it as an a c c e p d c  and valuabk ac- 
tivitywithinthccoatcxtofdomcfficand i n t c m a d p o l i t k s a n d t h c a  
appnwcd thc crpcnditurc of public funds accumry to support thc vcn- 
N~C. However, thc firs a n i f i d  satellite projects grew out of sticntifk 
ptopas;rlr madc for the International Geophysical Ycar (ICY) of 
1957-1958. a r n u k . i o a d  &oft to study thc cntk phmt. S d  par-
ticipants bclicvtd th;u thc IGY would k c n W  by using satellites to 
gathet gcophysiai and lfflophyuul data from above thc a r m o s p k ,  
and only two nations had the w d t h  and technology to answer the 
chalkngc of sprdlight at this d y  stlgc. thc United hta and thc 
Soviet Union. 'lhe scientists invohrtd in tbc IGY Lnm that morc than 
scientific riches would come from thc first succenful fhght of a mul.madc 
moon; politial and psychologid prestige with military O ~ C ~ ~ O I K S  would 
bc thc cxa bonus. 
Competition betwem the Soviet Union and thc Unitcd Stata for ic- 
m n a t i d  prestige was an extension of Cold War anituda that had 
existed between thcm s ine  the immcdiatc postwar yeus. Their alliuKc to 
dcfcat the Axis powers in World War I1 had bcm, in many ways. an 
unevy one. Ilhl with victory over the common enemy. thcy had begun to 
vicw cuh other with increasing apprehension and mistrun. In thc rtsult- 
ant rivalry. technology as translated into indusuial capacity and military 
hardwarc became a major indicator of national prestige and power. The 
Sovicts and Americans had cmcrgcd as victors from the World War in 
part bccausc the industrial scctoa of their respective socictia had pro- 
vidcd thcir troops in thc f ~ l d  with the machines of war in quantities that 
Gmnany industry could not match. Among this hard- wcrc two ncw 
wcapons that would become critical LO the postwar world. One was thc 
atomic bomb dcvclopcd by thc Unitcd Stata; the other was thc V-2 
rocket created by Germany. The signifiimcc of the fim atomic weapons 
was immcdiatcly apparent after Hiroshima and Nagasak~, but the pro- 
mix--or threat--of ballistic rockets w s  wen ltss clculy. perhaps bccaux 
the V-2 had bccn a lea than perfect weapon. But the Sovict and 
American military atablishmcnts kastcd no t k c  in developing this ncw 
ttchnology in thc dccadc following thc war. and both countries put 
military rockcts and nuclear research on their high-priority lists. 
The rcsults of this postwar competition Sttwecn thc Amcricans and 
the Sovicts are well known. The Soviets wcrc the fmt to orbit a satcllitc, 
which wu damaging enough to America's national ego; but morr wor- 
risome, thcy did it with an intcrcontincntal ballistic missilc that could bc 
uxd to dclivcr a decidedly morc lcthal payload. Thc Sovicts had obtained 
a highly visible and indiputabic technological first. Americans not only 
Table 1. Compardtive Data for the First Satellites Launched by the Soviet Union, the United States. Francc, Japan, the People's ;5 
Republic of China, and the United Kingdom o 
Datc of Lunch 
January 3 1 ,  1058 
Novcmlxr 26. 1961 
Fcbruary 11, 1070 
Apr~l 24, lu:O 
Country 
(launch vchlc.1~) 
Soviet Union 
(Rakctanosyrcl 
"Sputnik") 
Unircd Statcs 
Uupitcr-C) 
France 
(Diumant) 
Japan (Lambda 4s) 
Pcuplc's Republic 
of China 
(Long March I )  
Unircd Kingdom 
(Black Arrow) 
Namc of' Satcllitc 
(inrcrnationul 
designation) 
Sputnik I 
(1917.Alpha) 
Explorer I 
( 1058-Alpha) 
A 1 
( 1965-96A 
Osumi 
( 1970.11 A) 
East is Red 
(lL)7O.34A) 
Apc)gcc 
km 
(statute miles) 
Prrigec 
km 
(nature miles) 
Pcrlod 
minurcs 
perceived the chrrlkag of this accomplishment but a h  saw it as a thmt 
to their security 2nd their p k  as the d ' s  k d h g  military power. As 
the Sovica mped politial, military. and scientific rmuns h m  their new 
star. Amcrkvl kadc~s embarked upon a pcmd of decp, worried =if- 
aaminat ion .Thcobvious~ l l~~touhcSovie t fc l twasanin~-  
tionaftheAmericvlprogr~ms~iwacha~lteIlitedaniacreutinthe 
tempo of military rocket research. Dedvtd or not. a bilateral 
t e c h n o w  competition hod begun in this ocw arena. The "spre ram'' 
of the 1960s. at least for the United States, also brrmK a visible 
civhn-and perdul-sumgate for the mom sccm milimy anns rre. 
It has been argued that NASA's A p o  prognm cculd be interpreted u 
Americl's way of telling the Soviet Union and the world that it was still a 
xchnologicll giant to d o n  with. "If we a n  land a man on the 
moon.. . ."-would-be iulmmrics were invited to complete the 
scnttncc. The message was clear: The sophisticated technology applied to 
the lunar exploration project could be d y  transhed to military systems. 
The French, under the leadership of G e n d  Charles DcGauk, 
devly undcmood this fact of life. Caught between the Scyh and 
Chvybdis of Soviet and American nuclear armament. DeGaullc was con- 
vinced that the French must develop a n u b  military capability in- 
dependent of the two superpowers if they hoped to maintain credibility as 
a military and political power. The French began development of their 
Diamant (Diuwnd) launch vehicle in the early 1960s as a nuclear 
weapons delivery system. Taking advantage of the fm test hunch of the 
the-stage missile, the French ?Iso orbited their fm satellite on 
November 26, 1%5 (with NASA launching another French-made 
satellite, the R U I ,  a f m  days hta.)  Because it had no scientific mission 
and carried only limited mdio instrumentation. the A1 satellite was 
criticized by the world's scientifii community, but French military 
authorities readily admitted that the primary objective for the mission 
had been to rest the missile. Here was proof chat the French nuclearfimc 
rk fioppe was indeed genuine. The French could also play the game of 
surrogate technology. 
Japan became the fourth nation to develop the technology necessary 
to join the space club, but unlike the Soviets. Americans, md  French, the 
Japmese did not use a modified military hunch vehicle. Their postwv 
constitution forbade the construction of such offensive military hardware, 
allowing them only defensive military quipment. Civilian organizations 
interested in the scientific and practical utilization of space served as the 
catalysts in Japan for the development of launchers and satellita. While 
not as technologically advanced as the Soviets or the Americans and still 
n o c ~ m x , ~ f n w t h e ~ d W d W u . t h e J n p r a c s c  
badshucdtheinmcnsofthed~insprccrp~sincethe 
I G Y p c n o d . T h t o u g h t h e ~ t e o f I ~ . i d d S d c n c t a t T o L p o U ~ -  
sity. Jlgvl participated in the InrrmuioaPl Geophysical Yar in 1958 by 
h u n d u a g d s o u n d i a g r o c t c t s a p a b k o f a t L r g ~ ~ t ~  
in the upper amxsphcrc and went on to hunch succasi*cly more power- 
ful swndiag rockets in 1%1. 1%). and 1966. On Fcbnury 11.1970. the 
lnscituteofSp~nmdAcronurticPlSciencr(fwwdfnwrhemcrgcrob 
thc Institute af I n d d  Science and thc Tolrpo University Aamautical 
Laboratory) orbited its fint sptellite. Japan's Lambda 4s hunch rthidc 
was domdcdy  developed, as was its sucrrssor M-roctet. 'Ihc N-roctct 
hunchcr is a hybrid made from the M - I I - W - m b t e d  
Dclta(Thor)boostetandanuppersagedcvcbped~Jlp~ln.rith 
tcchnhl vsiftvKe from RochrcII Intcrmriond. Mimbishi Havy ln- 
dusuies strvcs as the National Sprc Development Agency's pr im con- 
tnctor. The Japanese satellite progrvn is divided between scxdcd pmc- 
tical and scientific projects; the former arc conducted by the National 
Space Development Agcocy, the latter by the Institute of Space aad 
Aeronautical Science. 
Two and a half months after tht Japanese lwnched their fint 
satellite, military and space s p c c d s s  of the Pcopkes Republic of China 
launched theirs. It was d k d  Eart is Red, bmusc it broadcast that mhi- 
t i o n q  anthem as it orbited the Evth cmy 114 minutes. As had the 
Soviets. Americans. and French, the Chinese adapted an intermediate 
range ballistic missile d c d  Long March 1 to carry their less-lethal space 
payloads. The last country to date to develop its own satellite and launch- 
ing capability was the United Kingdom. The Black Arrow Iwnchtr, 
created for just this purpose, b e d  thc satellite hspe tv  into orbit on 
October 28. 1971. It was the only satellite launched with this British- 
rmde rocket. Since then, the British have relied on NASA hunch vehicles 
for their various space projects. 
All six countries entered this exclusive dub to somc extent for 
politid reasons; for somc practial and xientitic motives were more im- 
portant. For the Soviet Union, the United States, and the People's 
Republic, military reasons certainly figured highly. In the Sovict Union, 
&re are two space programs, OM military and one scientific. Military 
organizations apparently control the manukture of ail hunch vehicles 
and supervise the hunch Ebcilitits and operations. America's space pro- 
gram is more neatly compuunentalizsd. The National Aeronautics and 
Space A a t i o n  was created in 1958 as a civilian space oqphtion, 
with the congrcssiod mandate to promote the peaceful exploration and 
in- of sp;rct. Thc DepPrtwnt of Deftast. primarily through 
the Air Fam. was kft to conduct thc county's miluPry spree prognm, 
tbcfullddofnhichucaot~~undezstoodbKwsrofouioa;rl 
sccuriry taaktiom on the m k  of information. Fmtxc, the Peopk's 
Republic. and the United Kingdom dl opcntc thcir s p d h g h t  prognms 
thrwgh the dm. but cniiiPn lgcocics develop much ofthe hardware 
and conduct most of the rcscuch. In Jqan. of coursc, the entire prognm 
is in tht hands of cidans.  
Spadqh t .  qwadly  with orbital splcccnft, has opened entircly 
new vistas for thc notMws n i t n t a w  comrr,..~ .r . Tabk 2 presents a record 
a f s p l r r ~ n # r c s f u l i n  - E ; c d  orbit or beyoad. 
~ p r h . p a m n d i c r l d u n g ~ ~ . m r i c s ~ ~ c ~  
mdd&gnofoursolarsyacmbwrtsukedfromouraplo*ltionsof 
s p r e , s c i e n t i r a d o h a v c a ~ o f n c n d a t a b y ~ t o u n d a s t ? n d  
plvKt Earth. its Moon and sism planets. and the mtdlum of in- 
taplvmvg spare. Hundrcds of investigations-zmmomial, bb-. 
gcophpsrcrl-have bcm Iaudcd since the luc 19505. In addition to 
serving tbe scicntisa as infixmation gatberm, slteIlitcs baw been put to 
other usts. S u m q i q  the planet from h@ dtituda, s a t c k  serve as a 
tool for spcdms who hope to improve the mamgcmmt of our ~ m d  
rrsourccs and to iacrcvc the cffiuency of apcultural pncticts. But it is 
sop- wuthcr forecvting and communic;ltions that paItkL&uly 
attract new customers to the spacefold and keep them tha t  
Long-range wcuhcr predictions and hi& qualiq rammunicltions 
ovcr long d i s t ~ ~ k s  arc two imprunt,  h & l y  visibk, practical conmbu- 
tions the space age has brought us dl. The Soviet Union, Japan, and 
China in particular haw important tcquirem~ts for improving their 
communicauons and meteorological systems. Russia's and China's huge 
lvld misses make it di&cult for them to develop adequate land-bad 
communiatio~s systems and weather reporring networks at rcasonabk 
costs. Widely scattered communities rn bc connected through satellite 
c o m m ~ t i o n s  links and weather patterns for iYgc areas observed more 
e&icatly from EPrth orbit than from the ground. Both countries hope to 
bypass the compkx ground-lines cornmunic?tions system that serve tfit 
United States, Europc, and Western Russia by investing in satcliitc 
systems instal. For a crowded island popStion like Japan, reMk 
weather prediction is critical to ~gnculnuc, fishtng, and personal safety. 
The Japancse have a h d y  developed an advanced communications 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
A SPACEFARING PEOPLE 
OF POOR w
iU
in
 
satellite network that enhances thcir undisputed success in the fields of 
electronics and automation. In both the U.S. and Japan, business and in- 
dustry have increased thcir use of facsimile and computer data transmis- 
sions, creating the so-called electronic office. Satellites play an essential 
role in this latest communications revoIution. 
The Soviets launched their fust communications satellite, Molnzya 
1-1,  in April 1965. Since that time through 1979, they have orbited 45 
MoInzya-1. 17 Mdnzyu-2, and 12 Molnba-3 class sdtellita, all of which 
had 12-hour orbits. In addition, they have scnt three Gorizont, four 
Ekran, and three Raduga type communications satellites into 24-hour 
orbits to ux for telephonic, telegraphic, television, and radio transmis- 
sions. In 1978, two amateur radio communications satellites called R d i o  
wcre boosted into orbit. These two spacecraft wcre similar in purpose to 
the American ham radio satellite series known as Oscar. In 1978 and 
1979, the Soviet Union also launched 54 military communirations 
payloads as part of the Kosmos program; 48 of these were launched in 
groups of eight with six launch vehicles (Kosmos 976-983, Kosmos 
1013-1020, Kosmos 1034-1041. Kosmos 1051-1058, Kosmos 1081-1088, 
and Kosmos 1130-1 137). During the same time period, nlnc Kosmos 
navigation satellites were deposited in Earth orbits. The Meteor weather 
satellite program has included 27 Meteor-1 and 5 Meteor-2 class 
spacecraft. 
By comparison with the Soviet Union and the United States, Japan is 
just beginning to build up its applications-or practical-satellite pro- 
gram, but it is moving ahead steadily. Japanese goals include the develop- 
ment of launch vehicles capable of placing satellitcs into geostationary 
orbit, the necessary tracking and control technology for such spacecrdt, 
and the perfection cf attitude colltrol systems technology. NASA has 
launched two geostationary communications satellitcs and one geosta- 
tionary meteorological satellite for the Japanese. Their fust two attempts 
to orbit thcir Experimental Commu~~ications Satellite with the N-rocket 
in February 1979 and February 1980 resulted in failure. Concerned but 
undeterred, space agency managers and designers will continue with thcir 
program for a more advanced rommunications satellite system. A xcond 
Geostationary Meteorological satellite, GMS-2, is scheduled for la. -1ch by 
an N-rocket this year. In another applications program, the Japanex 
recently conducted an experiment in processing materials (an alloy, in this 
cue) in space. 
Space activities in the People's Republic of China are moving slowly 
from the initial stages of experimental launches and satellites to a more 
comprehensive program that will stress the practical applications of space 
technology. especially in communications, meteorology, and Earth 
resources management. In Novembei and December 1978, Chinese and 
American space officials met in the U.S. (the American delegation led by 
NASA Administrator Robert A. Frosch and the Chinese team by Presi- 
dent of the Chinese Academy of Space Technology Jen Hsin-min) tc ex- 
plore wilys in which the two countries could cooperate in the field of space 
technology. A key topic in these discussions was the development of a civil 
r ur- communications satellite system for mainland China. Involved is th - p 
chase by the Chinese of an American r-tellite communications system, in- 
cluding the associated ground receiving and distribution equipment. 
NASA would launch the satelEtes into geostationary orbit, and China 
would take over once the system was operational. A similv cooperctive 
agreement was reached concerning the sale to China of a ground station 
capable of receiving Earth resources information from the NASA- 
National Ocean;, ard Atmospheric Administration Landsat remote- 
sensing satellites, including the Landsat-D scheduled for launch in the 
last quarter of 1982. 
Since the first round of visits in 1978, the Chinese and Americans 
have had additional traveling exchanges i.ivoiving government space 
agency officials and industry  representative^. It is important to note that 
having successfully orbited domestically built satellites with their own 
lauqch vehicles, neither the Chinese nor the Japanese find it unacceptable 
to acquire foreign assistance with projects of immediate importance as 
they work to advance the state of their own technology-a very pragmatic 
attitude. China's most immediate goals are to develop a more powerful, 
efficient launch vehicle, advanced solid-state electronic components, and 
sophisticated communications and meteorological satellites. 
China's new three-stage launch vehicle, called Long March-3, is ex- 
pected to bc flawn this year, probably with an experimental communica- 
tions satellite. The thud stage of this vehicle will have a liquid-hydrogen 
and liquid-oxygen fuel system similar in cancept to the American Centaur 
upper stage. These cryogenic fuels are difficult to handle, and the mastery 
of such te ' 13010gy by the Chinese will be a great leap forward. A 
19-membe, delegation from the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics visited China's aerospace f~il i t ies in November 1979 and 
made some candid assessments in their China Spat Report: "We con- 
clude that the Chinese are serious about theil stated goal of an itldepen- 
dent capability in communications satellites in the next decade, and are 
making good technological progress toward it. Their own frequently cited 
description of their technology as "primitive" is ~rcessively modest. ''Ad- 
vanced, but simple," would be more apt. What they do lack, vant, and 
expect to get from the U.S. is integrited know-how or "how to put it ail 
together. " They do not have experience or skills in systems engineering 
and program management. They do not seem to know much, for exam- 
ple, about designing to conflicting goals. such as performance, weight, 
power, cost, etc. Thty need information about reliability modeling and 
quality assurance te~chniques, and about scheduling ard project control. 
To some extent the Chinese economic and social system has insulated 
designers from the concept of cost, at least for their own developments." 
Unfortunately, the Chinese have been forced by economics to pospr te  
for several years the acquisition of the American-built satellites (two 
operational and one hackup at about $150-250 millicn), but thry w~ll un- 
doubtedly continue with their own research and development, even if at a 
lower level than before. Likewise, they have had to push back plans for 
their manned program until th . 1990s (the first flights had originally 
been planned fo: the late 1980s). 
If we tally up the total number of spacecraft launched from 1957 
through 1979, we see that the USSR has a clear lead at 1,250. The U.S. 
follows at 743; then France 10, Japan 15, China 8, and the United 
Kingdom 1. Because of the Soviets' use of the catchall designation 
"Kcsmos" (1 147 of which had been launched through 1979) and the 
secrecy surrounding military satellites. we cannot classify all 2027 satellites 
by payload (scientific, meteorological, communications, etc.), but we can 
see certain trends (see tables). There has been an increase in communica- 
tions and meteorological payloads over purely scientific investigations. 
Military payloads also-presumably many of thew are communications 
and reconnaissance satellites-have been popular -ith the Americans and 
the Soviets. 11s public funds available for exptnsive space projects become 
scarcer in the years immediately ahead, it is probably safe to assume that 
ventures with some practical application that can be easily justified-like 
communications, weather forecasting, ar military reconnaissance-will be 
funded more readily than scientific or experimental advanced systems 
payloads. 
The Future 
It ;an be dangerous for historians ta ventuie into the field of projec- 
tions; our crystal balls are as foggy as everyone else's. But the comments 
presented here are based upon projecTions made by Soviet, Chinese, and 
Japanese space experts. Clearly, thckr will be only five major space powers 
during the remainder of this century: the Soviet Union, the United 
States, the European Space Agency, Japan, and the Peoplc's Republic of 
China. And they will all apparently be concentrating their efforis on 
Earth orbital operations for thc fomccable future. with occasional 
planetary probe missions f ir  scicntif~ investigation. All five powers look 
forward to their fmt manned or nen-generation manncd projms. The 
Soviets will continuc with thcir Soyuz-Sdynr missions. building toward a 
lvge Eurh-orbiting space nation. A ~ ~ c t i c m s  hope to cnter a near en of 
manned spaceflight next month with the launch of the fm Shuttle or- 
biter. Shuttle flight: will givc European mission specialists assigned to 
ESA's Spzcelab an opportunity to cxperimcc spaceflight. and thc 
Japancx. among othcn. plan to send thcir payloads aloft via thc new 
American space transportation system. Although thc Chincx and 
,hpanee cannot cxpcct to conduct thcir fm manned missions until late 
in thls century. Chincx publications illustmtc astronaut training ir. 
skacccraft cabin mockups, simulators. and centrifuges. 
In thc spherc of satellite projccts, thc Sokict Union wi!l continuc 
with its scientif~. communications. mctcorologd, and militvy projccs, 
with greater emphasis on Evth rcsourca and oceanographic invcstiga- 
tions. Bhusbu. launched on June 7,  1979, w u  a joint %vier-Indian 
Earth resources satellite, and k;orm~s 1096. launched on April 15, 1970. 
was bclievcd to have been a partially successful ocean rcconnaissamc 
satellite (orbit d.cayed November 24. 1979). Thc Japancse arc committed 
to hunching increasingly advmced communications and mctcorolog~al 
spacccraft, but thcy also plan to become more deeply involved in Earth 
rcsourca investigations and ~ t t c r  practical missions, like material proccss- 
kg.  For the mid-1980s. thcy have plans tor biological payloads and 
limited lunar and planetary exploration with spacecraft of thcir own 
dcsign and construction. Chin- plans call for the launch d thcir ex- 
perimental co~nmunicarions s4tellitcs in 1081 2nd an experimental 
meteorological satellite the ncxt year (the Chincsc weather satellite has 
been dexribed as roughly equivalent to the American Improved i'iros 
Operational Satellite-ITOS). This spacecraft will be placed in a 
900-kilometer polar orbit. !t is also likely that the Cilinese will continuc 
aork with military rec~nnaissance satellites. and it has been suggested 
that their manned ' Skylab" will have a mi!itar)- reconnaissance function. 
the same thina has been said for the Soviet Sdjrrt. Manned observation 
craft could precede the availability of spacecraft equipped with remote- 
sensing deviccc by several years. A "box score'. of space activity through 
December 31, 1979 is given in table 3. 
Obviously, spaceflight is here to stay, and we will sce the tempo of 
activity increase considerably in the comirlg decades. As Walter A.  
McDougall has noted, just a; aircraft were the measure of a nation's 
- 
technology between the two world wars, space techno: jgy has become the 

pon-1945 symM of tcchdogka! pnraea. Abough rhc sprdLght 
C n t ~ b e g r n u t n c n r a a o a O f C d d W a r c o m ~ d ~ ~  
; a s ~ d p m J g h f i l ? . ~ d r b c p o ~ c ~ d p F c n y i t  
hught itr backm. it has b sufflincd for irs prPttiai valucs. th is 
cvcryday utility. To bc ccrmin natim Fiil ccmtit~uc to met~uft aoc 
another by what the)- haw or haw not amompMd m amain 
t ~ u t n r s . d s p v c ~ b c o a c o f t h c m . B u t i n d i r i d r u l n a -  
6011sdcxamincthcirom~inrcrrmofdKrYtiCJbCLKfit j  
rhcir sprc programs arc b h p g  thcir or:. ycopk and socicxcommi 
s y m .  S ~ C  may d krht  "hyhfronti~~"-with dl t b c ' h p ~ d  
dmtm that that tcm. implia-but n is rhc dnidcnds deiroard back 
to Evth that will kccp thc advrnnut going. 
